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The Demise of Parliamentary
Supremacy? Canadian and American
Influences upon the New Zealand
Judiciary's Interpretations of the
Bill of Rights Act of 1990
DR. MICHAEL PRINCIPE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Governor-General of New Zealand signed the New Zea-
land Bill of Rights Act1 ("Act") in August 1990. The Governor-
General's assent to the Act ended a five-year debate over whether
New Zealand should continue to observe the principles of parlia-
mentary supremacy or incorporate into its constitutional system an
entrenched document placing certain individual rights beyond the
reach of Parliament.2 At the heart of this debate was the issue of
judicial review: should an undemocratic institution, such as the ju-
diciary, have the power to declare void the laws of a democrati-
cally-elected body, such as Parliament, if it finds that the laws are
inconsistent with its interpretation of this proposed constitutional
document?
When the New Zealand House of Representatives adopted
the Labour Government's long-promised Bill of Rights, critics
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1. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, N.Z. Stat., Nd. 109 (1990) (assented to by New
Zealand House of Representatives, Aug. 28, 1990).
2. See, e.g., Dr. A. Sharp, An Historical and Philosophical Perspective on the Propo-
sal for a Bill of Rights for New Zealand, in A BILL OF RIorrs FOR NEW ZEALAND 1 (Legal
Research Foundation ed., 1985); NEW ZEALAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, A GUIDE TO
THE PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS IN QUESTION AND ANSWER FORM 1 (1986); John
Tamihere, The Treaty of Waitangi and the Bill of Rights: A Plea for Recognition, 1987
N.Z.LJ. 151; Right Honorable Sir Robin Cooke, Fundamentals, 1988 N.Z.LJ. 158.
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claimed that it lacked the bite of an entrenched constitutional doc-
ument and that the supporters of parliamentary supremacy had
prevailed.3 This response may have been premature. Although
parliamentary supremacy remains the prevalent form of govern-
ment in New Zealand, the Bill of Rights Act provides the New
Zealand judiciary with an opportunity to move closer to the Cana-
dian and American practices of judicial review.
This Article will begin with a brief review of the New Zealand,
Canadian, and American constitutional histories. Next, this Article
will examine the New Zealand judiciary's initial interpretations of
the Bill of Rights Act of 1990 in light of the New Zealand, Cana-
dian, and American experiences. Finally, this Article will explore
the potential effect of these interpretations on New Zealand's gov-
ernmental system.
II. TH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORIES OF NEW ZEALAND,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES
A. The New Zealand Constitutional History
Parliamentary supremacy is the basis of New Zealand's polit-
ical system.4 Parliamentary supremacy means that the House of
Representatives is absolutely sovereign.5 Thus, in this system,
there are no formal checks on the powers of Parliament, except for
triennial elections. Since the National Government abolished the
second chamber of Parliament in 1950, some have argued that this
form of government can be called an "elected dictatorship," be-
cause the majority party in Parliament governs without any consti-
tutional checks.6
In examining the origins of parliamentary supremacy, it is
helpful to compare the focus of powers of New Zealand's system of
government with that of the United States. As maintained by the
3. See Rights Bill Finally Passed, EvENING PosT, Aug. 24, 1990, at 6; Disastrous, Says
Aids Foundation, EvErimro PosT, Aug. 24, 1990, at 6; Window Dressing, DOMINION, Aug.
28, 1990, at 8.
4. The concept of parliamentary supremacy originated in Great Britain. 502 PARL.
DEB. (HANSARD) 13,044 (1989) (statement of Hon. W.P. Jeffries). For a discussion of the
origin and development of parliamentary supremacy in Great Britain, see infra notes 7-26
and accompanying text.
5. 502 PARL. DEB. (HANsAR) 13,044 (1989) (statement of Hon. W.P. Jeffries).
6. RJ. O'Connor, A Second Chamber of the New Zealand Parliament?, 1988
N.Z.L.J. 4,4.
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eminent British scholar and Fellow of The Queen's College at Ox-
ford, Geoffrey Marshall:
In Britain and the United States the professed aims of govern-
ment are in principle similar, whilst the organization of the three
branches of government designed to further them are character-
istically different. As it happens, much of the world's constitu-
tion-making has reflected the competing claims of the English
concentration of powers and the American separation of pow-
ers-one featuring a theory of legislative sovereignty with its
ideological roots in Hobbes; the other a doctrine of equal and
semi-autonomous authorities, in part derived from the Lockian
philosophy of restricted governmental power and natural law.
7
Another eminent British scholar and Fellow of Pembroke College
at Oxford, R.F.V. Heuston, argued that the doctrine of parliamen-
tary supremacy originated in the political philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes and was developed by William Blackstone and Albert
Venn Dicey.8
In describing the unlimited legislative authority of Parliament,
Blackstone wrote:
It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the
kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act
of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial
elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally
impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its
power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parlia-
ment. True it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authority
upon earth can undo.9
Thus, Blackstone maintained that Parliament has the power to do
whatever it pleases. The writings of A.V. Dicey continued to re-
flect this notion.1o
Dicey aimed to explain the nature of parliamentary
supremacy, show that its existence is legal fact, discount any al-
leged legal limitations upon the sovereignty of Parliament, and
show that Parliament is an absolutely sovereign legislature.11 Di-
cey's definition of Parliament included the King, the House of
7. GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 1-2 (1971).
8. R.F.V. HEUSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1964).
9. ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 42 (10th ed. 1961) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160-61).
10. See generally id
11. Id. at 39.
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Lords, and the House of Commons, which, when acting together,
can be described as the King in Parliament.12 Under the principle
of parliamentary supremacy, Parliament has "the right to make or
unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is
recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or
set aside the legislation of Parliament." 13
Yet, according to Dicey, neither the King, the Houses of Com-
mons or Lords, nor the Law Courts can claim independent legisla-
tive power. First, the King must assent to bills proposed by the
Houses.1 4 Second, the Houses of Parliament, although possessing
complete control over their own proceedings, must accept that a
declaration or a resolution by either House is not in any sense a
law.1 5 Third, the parliamentary electors have the sole legal right to
elect the members of Parliament.16 Finally, although judges do
make a large portion of the English law, English judges cannot
claim any power to repeal statutes. On the other hand, acts of Par-
liament can and often do override the laws created by judges, mak-
ing judicial legislation subject to the supervision of Parliament and,
therefore, subordinate.1 7
In addition to discounting these various claims of independent
power by the individual branches, Dicey maintained that three of
the most prominent alleged limitations upon the legislative sover-
eignty of Parliament are invalid. First, Dicey discounted the inva-
lidity of an act of Parliament which opposes the principles of
morality or the doctrines of international law, on the grounds that
"[t]here is no legal basis for the theory that judges, as exponents of
morality, may overrule Acts of Parliament."18 Judges will presume
Parliament did not intend to violate rules of morality or principles
of international law and, therefore, will attempt to interpret stat-
utes as being consistent with those doctrines.19
Dicey also discounted the idea that Parliament does not have
the right to touch the Prerogative.20 Dicey argued that, although
12. Id
13. Id at 40 (defining law as being "any rule which will be enforced by the courts").
14. Id at 50-54.
15. Id at 54-59.
16. Id. at 59-60.
17. Id at 60-61.
18. Id. at 62.
19. Id.
20. Prerogative is the right of the Crown to govern.
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certain powers are left by law in the hands of the Crown and. are
exercised by the executive government, Parliament could regulate
or abolish these powers or, for that matter, any other branch of
royal authority at any time.
21
Finally, Dicey contested the alleged limitation on Parliament's
legislative authority to limit the enactments of its successors, argu-
ing that any attempt by Parliament to bind its successors limits the
discretion of the future Parliament and disables it from all avail-
able options in legislating for the public welfare. Because the cor-
nerstone of the law of the Constitution is the doctrine of the
legislative supremacy of Parliament and because no power under
the English Constitution rivals parliamentary supremacy, none of
these alleged limitations can be considered legitimate, either by
statute or by common law.2
Yet, conversely, Dicey did maintain that there are two actual
limitations on Parliament's sovereignty, one being external while
the other is internal. The external limit "consists in the possibility
or certainty that his subjects, or a large number of them, will diso-
bey or resist his laws." 23 Thus, it is possible that a law or set of laws
could be so unpopular that a large majority of the people would
decide to ignore them, challenging the sovereign's authority. Dicey
argued that this is true in even the most despotic monarchies.24 As
for the internal limitation on Parliament's sovereignty, Dicey ar-
gued: "Even a despot exercises his powers in accordance with his
character, which is itself molded by the circumstances under which
he lives, including under that head the moral feelings of the time
and the society to which he belongs.'"25 Therefore, the surrounding
social condition effectively restricts the legislature, forcing Parlia-
ment to remain within those guidelines or face the threat of being
ignored.26
This same notion of limitation upon sovereign power is found
in New Zealand. Although it appears that the power of Parliament
21. DICEY, supra note 9, at 63-64.
22. Id. at 64-70.
23. Id. at 76-77.
24. Id. at 77.
25. Id at 80.
26. Id. at 82-85. Interestingly, Dicey maintained that, in the context of the representa-
tive government, the divergence between the external and internal limits to the exercise of
sovereign power diminishes. The electors choose who occupies the House of Commons,
thereby assuring that their wishes will be observed by the government. Id
1993]
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is absolute, in reality, this omnipotence is somewhat theoretical. A
"vast array of social forces" constantly pressures Parliament when
it exercises its lawmaking function.27 These apparent forces con-
trolling parliamentary powers include: (1) the Cabinet's collective
and Ministers' individual responsibility to the House; (2) constitu-
tional conventions-those unwritten rules sustained by recognition
and acceptance; (3) the role of the courts in protecting certain fun-
damental common law rights; (4) the fact that the Governor-Gen-
eral must give Royal Assent to any bill of Parliament; (5) the
opposition party, who must track and publicize any improper ac-
tions of the Executive; and (6) the ballot, which ultimately decides
who shall govern.28 Even with these controls, however, critics have
argued that "many members of the public are concerned at the lack
of constitutional safeguards in New Zealand-safeguards that
other countries take for granted." 29
In New Zealand, no written constitutional document exists.
Instead, the New Zealand Constitution is a combination of various
statutes, conventions, and principles of the rule of law.30 In defin-
ing the principles of the rule of law, Dicey stated:
[I]t means in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predomi-
nance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary
power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of preroga-
tive, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the
government.... It means, again, equality before the law, or the
equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land
administered by the ordinary law courts . .. [and], lastly....
that, in short, the principles of private law have with us been by
the action of the courts and Parliament so extended as to deter-
mine the position of the Crown and of its servants; thus the con-
stitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land.31
Thus, in theory, these principles govern the government's actions
throughout the legislative process.
Of the various constitutional documents included within the
New Zealand Constitution, the Constitution Act of 1986 is the
27. R.D. MULHOLLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM 12
(1990).
28. O'Connor, supra note 6, at 4-6.
29. 509 PARL. DEB. (HANSARD) 2799 (statement of M.P. Bill Dillon).
30. MULHOLLAND, supra note 27, at 17.
31. DICEY, supra note 9, at 202-03.
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most significant 32 because it provides the central framework. for
governmental action.33 The Magna Carta of 1215, 34 the Petition of
Right of 1628, 35 and the Bill of Rights of 168936 are also significant
aspects of the New Zealand Constitution. 37
The Treaty of Waitangi 38 is of increasing constitutional impor-
tance. This controversial agreement between many of the Maori
Chiefs and Captain William Hobson, as representative of the
Crown, arguably gave Great Britain sovereignty over New Zea-
land.39 Today, many of New Zealand's legal scholars see the Treaty
as an important constitutional document. For instance, Sir Robin
Cooke, President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, has stated:
[N]o matter precisely how it should be categorised in law, it has
taken on in fact a vitality and potency of its own. For Maori its
mana has always been high. Now there can be few Pakeha who
in their hearts scoff at it or underrate its practical significance.
Some see it as a threat, and political capital is made out of that
point of view; but in truth theirs is a tacit tribute to the Treaty, a
reluctant recognition that it has become part of the essence of
the national life. Even its critics have to accept that it is a foun-
dation document. It is simply the most important document in
New Zealand's history.40
Even though the Treaty has gained the attention of several promi-
nent New Zealanders,41 however, it has done little to help the
plight of the Maori in New Zealand. For example, as a result of the
Maori land dispossession and the industrial revolution, "Maori
rights appear always to be relegated to second place." 42 In addi-
tion, although the Maori comprise ten percent of the population of
32. MuLHoLLAND, supra note 27, at 18.
33. See I.S. DICKINSON, UP-DATING THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION 193-98
(1988).
34. 9 Hen. 3, ch. 39 (1215) (Eng.).
35. 3 Cor. 1, ch. 1 (1627) (Eng.).
36. 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (1688) (Eng.).
37. Mut.LHOLAND, supra note 27, at 23.
38. The Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, Eng.-Maori, 6 HERTSLET'S COMMERCIAL
TREATIES.
39. RJ. Walker, The Treaty of Waitangi as the Focus of Maori Protest, in WAITANGI:
MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECrTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 263, 263 (I.H.
Kawharu ed., 1989).
40. Right Honorable Sir Robin Cooke, Introduction, 14 N.Z.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990).
41. Id.; see also Sir Kenneth Keith, The Treaty of Waitangi in the Courts, 14 N.Z.U. L.
REV. 37 (1990).
42. Tamihere, supra note 2, at 153.
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New Zealand, they own less than five percent of the nation's lands
and make up nearly fifty percent of New Zealand's prison popula-
tion.43 As a result, there is a deep Maori distrust of the Govern-
ment and its administration. 44 As discussions of the Treaty of
Waitangi in governmental circles increase, perhaps it will eventu-
ally be interpreted as being what the Maori have claimed it to be
for so long-an entrenched document guaranteeing rights to an in-
digenous people.45
Conventions are another important aspect of New Zealand's
constitutional foundation. Like the British Constitution, the New
Zealand Constitution has developed largely by way of a series of
rules called conventions. Rather than set out in statutes, these con-
ventions have evolved and have become established through fre-
quent usage and custom over a period of years.4 "Conventions are
adhered to and observed for political expediency and respect for
tradition and not because some specified sanction will follow on
breach." 47
As the New Zealand Constitution has evolved through the
years, so too have the roles of the various governmental institu-
tions. Today, these institutions include the Office of the Governor-
General, Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Together
they administer New Zealand's Government. Parliament, how-
ever, is clearly the most powerful branch of the government.48
Within Parliament, the Cabinet is the decision-making body and
the central figure in New Zealand's executive branch. The execu-
tive branch also includes the Executive Council and the depart-
ments of State.49
The New Zealand judiciary and its interpretation of the doc-
trine of stare decisis were the major source of law in New Zealand
until the twentieth century.50 Increased Parliamentary legislation
during this century, however, has shifted New Zealand's legal sys-
tem from an adversarial system into a system where the legislature
43. Chief Judge Dune, Protection of Minorities, 1987 N.Z.L.J. 260, 260. Chief Judge
Dune is Chief Justice of the Moan Land Court and Chairman of the Waitangi Tribunal.
44. Id.
45. Tamihere, supra note 2, at 153.
46. MuLHoLLAND, supra note 27, at 28-29.
47. Id. at 29.
48. 510 PARL. DEB. (HANsARD) 3453 (1990) (statement of Warren Kyd).
49. MuttoLLAn, supra note 27, at 30-31.
50. Id. at 103.
174 [Vol. 16:167
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990
has the untrammeled power to make laws.51 Into this system,. the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 52 was proposed, debated, and
enacted.
B. The Canadian Experience
The Canadian Parliament enacted the Canadian Bill of
Rights53 as an ordinary statute in 1960, forcing the Canadian judici-
ary to consider whether to take a more activist role in disputes in-
volving the government or to maintain its non-interventionist role
within the legislative realm. With few exceptions, the Supreme
Court of Canada chose to adhere to the principle of parliamentary
supremacy. One of the earliest cases involving the Bill of Rights
was Robertson v. The Queen.54 In that case, Justice Ritchie, speak-
ing generally about the Bill of Rights, laid the foundation for the
Canadian judiciary's eventual interpretation of its enactment:55
"The Canadian Bill of Rights is not concerned with 'human rights
and fundamental freedoms' in the abstract sense but rather with
such 'rights and freedoms' as they existed in Canada immediately
before the Statute was enacted. '56 This view drastically limited the
development of constitutional protection in the area of human
rights and civil liberties. Instead, the Court continued to act as an
umpire of disputes, carefully avoiding what it considered to be the
domain of the legislative body.57 "This, so-called 'frozen rights'
theory of interpretation clearly limited the potential development
of the Canadian Bill of Rights."58 Thus, it was not until the Cana-
dian Constitution went into effect in April 198259 that the judiciary
changed its approach toward judicial activism.60
The Canadian Constitution Act is located in schedule B to the
Canada Act,61 an enactment of the British Parliament. Canada re-
51. Id. at 71.
52. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1.
53. Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C., app. III (1985) (Can.).
54. 1963 S.C.R. 651 (Can.).
55. Bruce P. Elman, Altering the Judicial Mind and the Process of Constitution Making
in Canada, 28 ALTA. L. Rav. 521, 524 (1990).
56. Robertson, 1963 S.C.R. at 654.
57. See Elman, supra note 55, at 524.
58. Id.
59. Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (Eng.).
60. Carl Baar & Ellen Baar, Diagnostic Adjudication in Appellate Courts: The
Supreme Court of Canada and the Charter of Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 1, 2, 10
(1989).
61. Canada Act, supra note 59.
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quested the passage of the Act in order to transfer the source of
Canada's legislative authority from Great Britain to the Canadian
Parliament. The passage of the Canada Act in 1982 ended the
United Kingdom's involvement in the constitutional development
of Canada. 62 This development began with the British North
America Act,63 establishing the Dominion of Canada as a federa-
tion of most of the then existing colonies. 64 This Act made clear
Great Britain's control over all substantive matters relating to the
Canadian Constitution. For instance, any attempt by Canada's
Government to amend the basic structure of its own Constitution
would violate the Colonial Laws Validity Act,65 which voided any
provision in a colonial enactment that conflicted with a British Par-
liament statute extending to that colony.66
Over the years, the British Parliament amended Canada's
Constitution by amending the British North America Act. It be-
came evident, however, that the British Parliament would only
amend Canada's Constitution at the request of the Canadian Par-
liament, creating a constitutional convention. The Canadian Par-
liament would unilaterally use this forum if a proposed
constitutional change was of a purely Federal nature. Otherwise, if
the proposed amendment would affect provincial powers, the Ca-
nadian Parliament would seek the consent of the provincial
legislatures. 67
In 1931, the Statute of Westminster 68 recognized the de facto
independence of such British dominions as Canada and New Zea-
land.69 It provided that any further enactments by the British Par-
liament would only apply to the dominions if they were expressly
requested and assented to by that dominion.70 Because the Cana-
dian provinces had failed to reach an agreement with the Parlia-
ment regarding the formula for amending the Constitution, a
62. Alan Albert, Constitutional Law: Patriation of Canadian Constitution, 23 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 395, 395-96 (1983).
63. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (Eng.).
64. Peter W. Hogg, Canada's New Charter of Rights, 32 AM. J. Comp. L. 283, 283
(1984).
65. Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.).
66. Albert, supra note 62, at 395.
67. Edward McWhinney, The Constitutional Patriation Projec 1980-82, 32 AM. J.
Comp. L. 241, 247-52 (1984).
68. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (Eng.).
69. McWhinney, supra note 67, at 248.
70. Id.
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specific provision, Section 7.1, was inserted into the statute.71 Sec-
tion 7.1 provided that Canadian consent was not required for en-
actments altering, amending, or repealing the British North
America Act, 1867-1930.72 Thus, unlike the other dominions af-
fected by the Statute of Westminster, the British Parliament re-
tained the power to amend the Canadian Constitution.
73
The inability of the provinces and the Federal Government to
reach an agreement regarding the amendment process for an en-
trenched constitution frustrated the efforts of "patriation" for over
fifty years.74 Although the Federal Government had enacted the
Canadian Bill of Rights Act 75 and various provinces had enacted
bills of rights,76 these were ordinary enactments, not entrenched
constitutional provisions. Thus, it was not until the era of Pierre
Trudeau that an entrenched document became a possibility.77
As early as 1955, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, then a legal
academic, recommended that the Canadian Constitution "should
include a statement of fundamental rights. 78 In 1965, he proposed
an entrenched Bill of Rights as part of a general Canadian constitu-
tional reform. 79 An entrenched Bill of Rights, he argued, would
address the discontent manifested by the rise of the separatist
movement in Quebec and would establish a unified Canada.8°
The threat to Canada's national unity became even more dra-
matic a decade later when the Parti Quebeqois, led by Premier
Rene Levesque, was elected in Quebec. The primary policy of the
Parti Quebeqois was the secession of Quebec from the Canadian
Federation.81 In response to this threat to Canada's national unity,
the Federal Government proposed a new Constitution with a Char-
71. Albert, supra note 62, at 395.
72. British North America Act, supra note 63, § 7.1 (variety of amendments during
the period).
73. Albert, supra note 62, at 395.
74. Patriation is the term used to describe the process by which legislative authority is
shifted from Great Britain to Canada. McWhinney, supra note 67, at 247.
75. Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note 53.
76. Alberta Bill of Rights, R.S.A., ch. A-16 (1972) (Can.); Human Rights Code,
R.S.O., ch. 53 (1981) (Can.); Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, S.S., ch. 35 (1947) (Can.);
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, S.S., ch. 5-9 (1978) (Can.).
77. Hogg, supra note 64, at 287.
78. Randolph Hahn, Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1984 PuB. L. 530-31.
79. Peter H. Russell, The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 61 CAN. B. REv. 30, 34 (1983).
80. Id.
81. McWhinney, supra note 67, at 242-43.
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ter of Rights and Freedoms as its featured component.82 The in-
tent of the proposal was to unite the country on the basis of its
affirmation of a common set of values, thus negating any influence
the separatists might have in Quebec.83 On May 20, 1980, the Que-
bec referendum on Sovereignty-Association was held. With Prime
Minister Trudeau and several other provincial premiers lobbying
for a "no" vote by promising to initiate constitutional reform, the
Quebecers voted against Sovereignty-Association.84
Although the Quebecers' vote inspired the Parliament to pro-
ceed with constitutional reform immediately, Ontario and New
Brunswick were the only provinces in agreement with the proposed
constitutional changes.8 A stalemate between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the provincial premiers concerning the amending
formula continued through the first series of conferences.8 6 As a
result, Prime Minister Trudeau declared in October 1980 that his
Government would act unilaterally to request passage of the Con-
stitution Act by the British Parliament.87 Because the remaining
eight provinces maintained that either unanimous or substantial
provincial support was necessary for the Federal Government to
initiate the process to amend the Constitution,88 the matter was
referred to the Courts of Appeal of Manitoba, Quebec, and
Newfoundland. 9
The Courts of Appeal reached conflicting results. 90 The Mani-
toba Court of Appeal ruled for the Federal Government by a ma-
jority of three to two.91 The Quebec Court of Appeal also ruled
for the Federal Government by a majority of four to one.92 On the
other hand, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal unanimously
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Peter W. Hogg, The New Canadian Constitution, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 221, 221
(1984).
85. Id. at 222-23.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mary Elizabeth Williford, Canadian Constitutional Law, 19 TEx. INrr'L LJ. 233,
233-34. See also Hogg, supra note 64, at 223; Albert, supra note 62, at 397-98.
91. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 117 D.L.R. 1 (Man.
1981).
92. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (No. 3), 120 D.L.R. 385
(Que. 1981).
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found for the provinces. 93 These decisions were appealed thereaf-
ter to the Supreme Court of Canada, which delivered its judgment
on September 28, 1981. 94 The Canadian Supreme Court held that,
although the Federal Government was not required by law to have
the provinces' consent before initiating constitutional change, a
"substantial degree" of provincial consent was required as a matter
of constitutional convention.95
In reaction to the politically unattractive ramifications of this
decision, the Prime Minister called for another conference among
the leaders of the Federal and provincial governments.96 This con-
ference led to a negotiated compromise among all of the provinces
except Quebec. The consenting parties agreed to certain amend-
ments, as well as to prevent from being argued and decided by the
British Parliament the issue of whether to pass a constitutional
amendment requested by the Canadian Federal Government yet
opposed by a majority of the provinces. As a result of these com-
promises, the proposed Constitution Act was transmitted to the
United Kingdom, where it was duly enacted by the House of Com-
mons and the House of Lords and given Royal Assent on March
29, 1982.97
Upon the passage of the Constitution Act, the Canadian Con-
stitution became the supreme law of the land. The Constitution
authorized the judiciary to invalidate any laws inconsistent with
this enactment.98 In addition, Part I of the Constitution-the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms- guaranteed to all Cana-
dian citizens legal, political, and linguistic rights, in addition to
rights of equality.99 As a result, the Constitution is now superior to
Parliament. The Supreme Court is the Constitution's guardian and
is responsible for the zealous protection of individual rights and
freedoms against legislative intrusion.100
Some argue, however, that the Supreme Court's zealous pro-
tection of individual rights partially stemmed from the composition
93. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution 9f Canada (No. 2), 118 D.L.R. 1
(Nfld. 1981).
94. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 1 S.C.R. 754 (1981)
(Can.).
95. Id.
96. Hogg, supra note 84, at 223-24.
97. Id.
98. Canada Act, supra note 59.
99. Id. pt. I.
100. Southam Inc. v. Director of Investigation, 2 S.C.R. 145, 155-56 (Can. 1984).
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of the Court's personalities. 101 If a number of the recently-retired
conservative Justices had been replaced by other conservatives, the
Court likely would have proceeded at a slower pace. With the ap-
pointment of more liberal Justices, however, the Supreme Court
effectuated a monumental break from Canada's constitutional
past.1o2
C. The American Experience
The original U.S. Constitution did not include a bill of rights.
The framers, "deep believers in natural rights," 103 omitted a bill of
rights at the Philadelphia Convention because they felt that one
would not be needed. They believed that, because the Federal
Government was to be limited, the expansive resources and
breadth of the country would prevent a tyrannical majority.1o4 The
framers argued that to include a bill of rights "would be an even
greater threat to liberty." 10 5 In Federalist 84, Alexander Hamilton
expressed this same rationale in his argument as to why it would be
unwise to adopt a bill of rights.10 6
As the ratification process unfolded, however, it became abun-
dantly clear that a large number of people were dissatisfied with
the omission of individual protection against governmental oppres-
sion.1°7 As a result, some states, notably Massachusetts, ratified
the Constitution on the condition that the protection of civil liber-
ties would be quickly incorporated into the document.108
As a staunch supporter of a bill of rights, Thomas Jefferson
proposed that ratification be delayed until the Constitution in-
cluded provisions protecting individual rights.109 Eventually, he
backed off from such demands,110 and instead, focused his energies
on convincing James Madison, through a series of letters, that a bill
of rights was necessary: "Let me add that a bill of rights is what the
people are entitled to against every government on earth, general
101. Elman, supra note 55, at 527.
102. Id. at 530.
103. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 38 (1987).
104. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 (1984).
105. Cox, supra note 103, at 38.
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
107. PrrrcHrr, supra note 104, at 2.
108. Id.
109. ALPHEUS MASON & GORDON E. BAKER, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING:
READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 277 (4th ed. 1985).
110. Id.
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or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest
on inference.""' In addressing the positive and negative aspects of
a bill of rights, Jefferson stated:
There is a remarkable difference between the characters of the
inconveniences which attend a Declaration of rights, and those
which attend the want of it. The inconvenience of the Declara-
tion are [sic] that it may cramp government in it's [sic] useful
exertions. But the evil of this is shortlived, moderate, and repa-
rable. The inconveniences of the want of a Declaration are per-
manent, afflicting and irreparable: they are in constant
progression from bad to worse. The execution in our govern-
ments is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my
jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable
dread at present, and will be for long years. 112
Madison, although not necessarily opposed to a bill of rights,
had never believed that the omission of one was "a material de-
fect." 3 Madison had observed numerous violations of such docu-
ments in the past and was concerned that by enumerating such
rights on paper, the public could limit their definitions further than
would a government." 4 Jefferson nevertheless convinced him that
a bill of rights was necessary. Madison's conversion was evident
when he adopted Jefferson's notion of the judiciary as the guardian
of these rights:
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bul-
wark against every assumption of power in the legislative or ex-
ecutive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the
declaration of rights.115
Yet, there was opposition to the proposed adoption of a bill of
rights from a number of sides on a number of issues. The extreme
anti-federalists believed that the convention had already gone too
111. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), quoted in MA-
SON & BAKER, supra note 109, at 285.
112. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), quoted in MA-
SON & BAKER, supra note 109, at 290.
113. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7, 1788), quoted in MASON
& BAKER, supra note 109, at 286.
114. Id. at 287.
115. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), quoted in
MASON & BAKER, supra note 109, at 293.
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far in centralizing Federal powers, thus lessening state powers to
protect individual rights. Their argument was based on a belief
that a bill of rights would be unnecessary in a system observing
state sovereignty. 116 James Madison, whose main concern was to
avoid the wrong kind of bill of rights, decided to propose the
amendments to the House of Representatives himself, ensuring
that his notions of a proper bill of rights would be adopted.117 Be-
cause of Madison's efforts, the states finally ratified the Bill of
Rights 18 on December 15, 1791.119 The application of the Bill of
Rights to actions by the Federal Government led many to assume
that individual states would provide protection against oppressive
state action. 120
Subsequently, and without express Constitutional support,1 21
the Supreme Court assumed responsibility as the final authority on
the interpretation of the Constitution.1 22 The Court's interpreta-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of
Rights as against state actions is the clearest example of this as-
sumption of power. Although the Court initially interpreted the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect only
economic freedoms and property rights against state actions,123 it
ultimately took the position that additional rights are also enforce-
able as against the states:
In the course of upholding the conviction of a prominent Com-
munist under the New York criminal anarchy statute, Justice
Sanford for the conservative Court made this astounding con-
cession: "We may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press ... are among the fundamental rights and 'liberties'
protected ... from impairment by the States." This issue had
not been argued before the Court, and the holding was unneces-
116. Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE
CoNsTrrErON OF THE UNITED STATES 32, 34-35 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).
117. Interestingly, Madison would have liked certain rights extended to the states;
however, because a consensus could not be reached during this Congress, the matter of
incorporating the Bill of Rights to the states remained dormant until a century and a half
later. Id. See also PRrrcrmEr, supra note 104, at 3; MASON & BAKER, supra note 109, at
282.
118. U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X.
119. PnrrcHErTr, supra note 104, at 3.
120. Cox, supra note 103, at 38.
121. Id. at 41-42.
122. Id. at 44-45.
123. PRrrcH-rr, supra note 104, at 19. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
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sary to the decision of the Gitlow case. It was in this offhand
manner that the historic decision was made enormously enlarg-
ing the coverage of the First Amendment and the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to guarantee the freedom of speech and
press against state or local action as well as against Congress. 124
Beginning with the Gitlow case,125 which incorporated the Bill of
Rights to apply as against the states, the Supreme Court, during the
Warren era, vastly expanded the constitutional protection afforded
to speech, press, and criminal procedure.12 6
Thus, from the Court's ground-breaking decision permitting
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison 27 to its gradual incorpora-
tion of most of the Bill of Rights provisions to the states, the U.S.
Supreme Court has exercised powers of judicial independence pre-
viously unheard of in judicial history. As a result, individual civil
liberties have expanded so that there are now far greater protec-
tion than were ever imagined by the framers of the Constitution.
D. History of New Zealand Bill of Rights Proposals
New Zealand's proposal for a bill of rights dates back to dis-
cussions by the National Government in the early 1960s.128 In Au-
gust 1963, the National Government introduced a bill of rights that
was based upon the Canadian Bill of Rights.1 29 After months of
debate, however, Parliament allowed the proposed bill of rights to
lapse.13o
The subject of a possible bill of rights remained in the public
background until 1981, when the Labour Party included a bill of
rights as part of its Election Manifesto. In 1984, it received even
greater prominence when the Labour Government featured a bill
of rights component in its Open Government Policy. 131 Finally, in
1985, the Labour Government introduced into the New Zealand
Parliament a White Paper supporting a bill of rights.132
124. PRnTCH=, supra note 104, at 20.
125. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
126. Cox, supra note 103, at 182.
127. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also PRrrcHETr, supra note 104, at 312.
128. 509 PARL. DEB. (HANSARD) 2799 (statement of Bill Dillon).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. NEW ZEALAND LABOUR PARTY, 1984 OPEN GOVERNMENT POLICY 4 (1984).
132. HONORABLE GEOFFREY PALMER, A BiLL OF RiGHTs FOR NEW ZEALAND: A
WHITrE PAPER 157 (1985).
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This White Paper included a Draft Bill of Rights as well as
explanations of the following: (1) what a bill of rights would do; (2)
why New Zealand needs a bill of rights; (3) how the proposed Bill
of Rights would deal with the Treaty of Waitangi; (4) how it would
operate in practice; and (5) how it would be adopted.1 33 The pro-
posed Bill of Rights primarily served to protect the fundamental
rights of New Zealanders against the potentially tyrannical power
of the state, accomplishing this purpose by giving the judiciary
power to interpret and enforce the Bill of Rights. In order to ac-
complish this goal, the Labour Government outlined its intentions
to adopt a bill of rights that would: (1) constitute the supreme law
of the land;134 (2) recognize the rights of the Maori under the
Treaty of Waitangi;13 (3) insure the right to freedom from discrimi-
nation;13 and (4) establish in the courts the power of judicial
review.137
E. Responses to the Bill of Rights
Over the subsequent five years, various groups continued to
debate the proposed Bill of Rights. These debates addressed
whether the Bill of Rights would bestow too much power on the
undemocratic judiciary, potentially making it the most powerful
branch of government or, conversely, whether legislative oppres-
sion could be prevented without a bill of rights.138 These debates
continued until August 1990, when, in response to the Labour Gov-
ernment's loss of political ground to the National Party shortly
before the October elections, Parliament passed a Bill of Rights
Act.139
The Bill of Rights Act, however, is far more limited than the
White Paper proposal. Rather than become the supreme law of
the land, the Bill of Rights Act is on the same level as any other
legislative enactment of Parliament. Thus, Parliament can alter or
even eliminate the Act at any time. Additionally, the Bill of Rights
Act fails to recognize the rights of the Maori under the Treaty of
133. I&
134. Id. at 68.
135. I& at 74-75.
136. h& at 85.
137. Id. at 109-16.
138. NADJA ToLu mcH, THE PROPOSED BiLL OF RIGHrs 79 (1986).
139. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1; 510 PARL. DEB. (HANsARD) 3773
(result of the vote was Ayes 36, Noes 28).
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Waitangi. 14° Most importantly, the Bill of Rights Act specifically
prohibits the judiciary from striking down laws of Parliament,
whether passed before or after the enactment of this Act.141 Un-
derstandably, supporters of an entrenched constitutional document
were generally disappointed.
Although the Bill of Rights Act prohibits striking down an en-
actment in violation of the Bill of Rights, the judiciary nonetheless
may be able to control the interpretation of an enactment. For in-
stance, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act specifically mentions the power to implement good
faith affirmative action measures 42 and the right to observe the
principles of natural justice,143 as well as the notion of judicial re-
view.'" When these sections are combined with Section 6 of the
Act,145 which specifies that the preferred interpretation of any en-
actment is the one that is consistent with the Bill of Rights,'4s it
would appear that the New Zealand judiciary is provided with an
opportunity to examine the interpretations of a variety of laws.
Although the impetus for the Labour Government's interest
in a bill of rights may have arisen from its criticisms of the previous
Administration's alleged excessive involvement in economic mat-
ters, it is unlikely that the Bill of Rights Act will address any issues
of that nature. Instead, as with Canada, the greatest amount of
litigation between the state and its citizens under the Bill of Rights
Act will likely occur in the area of criminal law. In fact, most litiga-
tion have arisen under those provisions within Part II of the Act
dealing with search, arrest, and detention.147 One provision in this
area that may have particular importance in the future is Section
27(2), which provides: "Every person whose rights, obligations, or
interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by a
determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the
right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that
140. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1.
141. Id § 4.
142. Id § 19(2).
143. Id § 27.
144. Id. §6.
145. Id
146. Id Section 6 states: "Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is con-
sistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be
preferred to any other meaning." IM
147. d §§ 21-27.
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determination."'1 Under this provision, a court, in examining the
actions of a public authority, could decide that the public authority
ignored Parliament's clearly-expressed intentions that its enact-
ments be interpreted consistently with the Bill of Rights. Courts
could maintain that, as Parliament has expressly stated a desire to
have issues of natural justice, human rights, freedom from discrimi-
nation, and other fundamental freedoms affirmed, protected, and
promoted in New Zealand, public authorities as well as tribunals
must consider these rights and freedoms in interpreting Parlia-
ment's enactments. Thus, even though courts cannot strike down
an enactment in violation of the Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights
could nonetheless give the judiciary a great deal of influence over
the administration of Parliamentary enactments.
New Zealand's Bill of Rights, therefore, has at least opened
the door to some judicial review of laws passed by Parliament. Yet,
as the Canadian and American experiences have shown, whether
the New Zealand courts will choose to take advantage of this op-
portunity depends in part upon the judges themselves.
III. THE NEW ZEALAND COURTS' FIRsT IMPRESSIONS OF THE
NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHis Acr
An examination of the New Zealand courts' initial interpreta-
tions of the Bill of Rights Act reveals an attempt to use the Bill of
Rights to prevent administrative oppression by interpreting this en-
actment so as to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.
Although the New Zealand judiciary has, in a number of cases,
found that the Bill of Rights Act did not apply,149 there has also
been a significant number of instances where the courts have ap-
plied and interpreted the Act.150
In those cases where the courts ruled that the Act does apply,
perhaps the two most cited sections of the Bill of Rights are Sec-
tion 6, which requires that the preferred interpretation of an enact-
ment is one consistent with the Bill of Rights, 51 and Section 23,
148. 1& § 27(2).
149. See, e.g., R. v. Paiti, T. 184/90, Auckland H.C., Oct. 17, 1990 (Smellie J.); Minto v.
Police, AP. 161/90, Auckland H.C., Feb. 7, 1991 (Robertson J.); Terekia v. Ministry of
nTansport, AP. 32/91, Auckland H.C., May 13, 1991 (Barker J.); Dental Council of N.Z. v.
Bell, [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 438 (Wellington H.C. 1991); R. v. Edwards, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 463
(Auckland H.C.).
150. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 153, 160.
151. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, § 6.
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which concerns the rights of persons arrested or detained.152 Both
the New Zealand Court of Appeal and the High Court have stated
the importance of Section 6 in a variety of cases. 153 In R. v.
Rangi,154 the Court of Appeal relied on Section 6155 and Section
25(c) of the Act' 56 to quash a lower court's conviction and sentence
on the grounds that the district court judge's instructions to the
jury were improper. 57 The Court ordered a new trial, stating that
Section 202(4)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 must be interpreted in
light of the Bill of Rights Act and that, as a result, the Crown,
rather than the defendant, carries the burden of proof as to defend-
ant's possession of a knife in a public place without lawful author-
ity or reasonable excuse. 15 Thus, under the Bill of Rights Act, a
criminal defendant charged with an offense (at least under this Sec-
tion of the Crimes Act) will have certain procedural protection
concerning the burden of proof that were not available before the
Act came into force. Whether these procedural protection will ap-
ply to other criminal enactments will have to be addressed, espe-
cially considering the Court of Appeal's statement that even
though Section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act "is an im-
portant section... it has no application unless the enactment in
question can be given a meaning consistent with the rights and
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights." 59
A number of Court of Appeal and High Court cases also have
dealt with Section 23 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.1W In
152. Id § 23(1). Section 23(1) states:
Everyone who is arrested or who is detained under any enactment-(a) Shall be
informed at the time of the arrest or detention of the reason for it; and (b) Shall
have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to be informed
of the right; and (c) Shall have the right to have the validity of the arrest or
detention determined without delay by way of habeaus corpus and to be released
if the arrest or detention is not lawful.
Id
153. See, e.g., Flickinger v. Crown Colony of Hong Kong, [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 439 (Wel-
lington C.A. 1990); R. v. Phillips, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 175 (Wellington C.A.); R. v. Rangi,
[1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (Wellington C.A. 1991); Re S., [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 363 (Auckland
H.C.).
154. [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (Wellington C.A. 1991).
155. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, § 6.
156. Id. § 25(c). Section 25(c) stipulates that everyone charged with an offence has, at
a minimum, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. Id
157. Rangi, [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 389.
158. Id
159. R. v. Phillips, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 175, 176 (Wellington C.A.).
160. See, e.g., Flickinger v. Crown Colony of Hong Kong, [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 439 (Wel-
lington C.A. 1990); R. v. Kirifi, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 8 (Wellington C.A. 1991); Ministry of
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R. v. Kirifi,161 the Court of Appeal upheld a district court's exclu-
sion of a videotape of the defendant's oral admissions during an
interview because the police had not advised the defendant of his
right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay even though he
had been in custody for over three hours.162 The Court of Appeal
stated: "It seems to us that, once a breach of § 23(1)(b) has been
established, the trial judge acts rightly in ruling out a consequent
admission unless there are circumstances in the particular case sat-
isfying him or her that it is fair and right to allow the admission
into evidence.' 6
3
Similarly, in R. v. Crime Appeals,164 the Court of Appeal
found that the rights of the accused under Section 23(1)(b) had
been plainly violated without excuse. In Crime Appeals, one of the
accused apparently admitted that he committed aggravated rob-
bery, but had not been told that he was being arrested or otherwise
advised of his rights. The other accused was coerced into making
admissions despite his previous requests to see a lawyer. President
Cooke found:
[T]he Acts must not be construed narrowly or technically, but
applied in a realistic way. It is an affirmation of the basic rights
of the people in New Zealand, and these rights cannot be hard
and fast in their operation. The Act must normally be given pri-
macy, subject only to the clear provisions of other legislation. 165
Thus, President Cooke held that "prima facie a violation of rights
renders any evidence obtained inadmissible. The Act is not merely
a relevant factor in exercising the Court's discretionary jurisdic-
tion."166 Although Justices Gault and Holland questioned some of
Transport v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260 (Wellington C.A.); R. v. Thompson, T. 72/91,
Rotorua H.C., Dec. 13, 1991.
161. [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 8 (Wellington C.A. 1991).
162. Id
163. Id. at 12.
164. 1991 BuTTERwoRTHs CURRENT L. 2173 (Wellington C.A.).
165. Id
166. Id
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the implications of the Act's provisions, 167 the decision ordering a
rehearing in this appeal was unanimously allowed. 16
Perhaps the most important case dealing with Section 23 of
the Act is Ministry of Transport v. Noort.169 In Noort, the Court of
Appeal reversed the lower court decision, which had disposed of
the Bill of Rights argument by holding that the Transportation Act
could not be given an interpretation consistent with the application
of Section 23(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights Act.170 The Court of Ap-
peal, relying on Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Bill of Rights Act,171
held that it would not substantially impair the administration of the
Transportation Act to allow motorists suspected of driving under
the influence of alcohol a limited opportunity to contact a lawyer
by telephone and take advice before assenting to undergo breath
and blood tests. 172 In so ruling, the Court noted the importance of
Section 6173 and declared that it applies in instances where enact-
167. Id.
Gualt J stated that while a denial of rights will usually result in the exclusion of
evidence, the Courts must be cautious to ensure that this does not lead to effec-
tive automatic exclusion.... Holland J, in particular, expressed reservations
about the possible implications of the Act's provisions, without the introduction
of other measures to balance between the rights of the individual, and the need to
bring law breakers to justice.
Itd
168. Id
169. [199213 N.Z.L.R. 260 (Wellington C.A.). This case was heard together with Police
v. Curran.
170. Id. at 266-67.
171. Section 4 of the Act states:
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights)-(a) Hold any provision of the
enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or
ineffective; or (b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-by reason
only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, § 4.
Section 5 of the Act states:
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Id. § 5.
Section 6 of the Act states:
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to
any other meaning.
Id. § 6.
172. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 271-74.
173. 1d at 272-73.
Turning to § 6, it is to be noted that this is one of the key features of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights. It lays down a rule of interpretation comparable in impor-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ments are ambiguous rather than clearly inconsistent.174 Here, the
Acts were only ambiguous, as "the two Acts can reasonably stand
together."1
75
Additionally, the Court of Appeal has interpreted the Section
23 right to legal advice as a fundamental right:
Internationally there is now general recognition that some
human rights are fundamental and anterior to any municipal
law, although municipal law may fall short of giving effect to
them .... The right to legal advice on arrest or detention under
an enactment may not be quite in that class, but in any event it
has become a widely-recognised right... and one of those af-
firmed in New Zealand. It has great 'strategic' value as a safe-
guard against violations of undoubtedly fundamental rights such
as the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained .... Sub-
ject to contrary requirements in any legislation, the New Zea-
land Courts must now, in my opinion, give it practical effect
irrespective of the state of our law before the Bill of Rights.176
Thus, in reflecting upon the cases applying Section 23(1)(b) of the
Bill of Rights Act, the New Zealand courts have determined that
the Bill of Rights provides enforceable protection of individual
rights in the area of criminal procedure, including the right of those
accused of a crime to consult a lawyer without delay.
The New Zealand courts have also addressed other rights enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights Act. For example, in Knight v. Com-
missioner of Inland Revenue,177 the Court of Appeal reversed a
lower court decision permitting the Inland Revenue Department to
invoke statutory privilege against the disclosure of documents.
President Cooke, in a separate opinion, relied upon Section 27(3)
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to strengthen his conclu-
sion. 78 He argued that because of Section 27(3),
tance to-perhaps of even greater importance than-§ 50) of the Acts Interpre-
tation Act 1924 .... Section 6 may be seen as to some extent a quid pro quo for
the rule of statutory primacy in § 4. The rights and freedoms in Part II are not
constitutionally entrenched and may be overridden by an ordinary enactment, but
in interpreting an enactment a consistent meaning is to be preferred to any other
meaning.
Id at 272.
174. 1d. at 273.
175. Noort, [19921 3 N.Z.L.R. at 274 (limiting expressly the Court's conclusion to the
context of evidential breath tests and blood tests).
176. Id. at 270.
177. [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. 30 (Wellington C.A. 1990).
178. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, § 27(3). Section 27(3) provides:
"Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil proceed-
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[t]he Crown as a defendant in litigation should be in the same
position as an individual. That cannot exclude public interest
immunity, which applies wherever the public interest demands,
no matter whether or not the Crown is a defendant. But, as
previously explained, public interest immunity is no longer
claimed in this case.179
The role of the Bill of Rights in this decision remains unclear, as
the other Justices agreed with President Cooke's decision without
citing the Act.180 Still, future cases that involve the Crown as a
defendant will likely rely upon President Cooke's citation to the
Bill of Rights.
In R. v. Chignell, s18 the High Court relied on Section 14 of the
Bill of Rights Act 82 to dismiss an application by the Crown to pro-
hibit the broadcast of an interview of a former witness to a trial
who had since recanted his testimony. In preparing for the retrial
granted to the defendants by the Court of Appeal, the Crown was
concerned that this interview would be prejudicial to the conduct
of a fair trial even though they did not plan to call upon this former
witness in the new trial. The High Court stated:
Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 reiterates
the value of freedom of expression and freedom of information
within our society. Although there is a need for responsibility
and restraint to ensure that there be a fair and proper retrial, it
would be an unwarranted over-reaction by the Court to respond
as is here suggested. However, there should be no doubt as to
the willingness of the Court to act firmly and decisively if there
is comment or activity which is in fact destructive of a fair
trial.183
Thus, the Bill of Rights Act also supports an enforceable right to
freedom of expression in some situations.
One final case of interest concerning the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act is the district court decision in Police v. P.C.F.18 In this
ings brought by, the Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, according to law, in the
same way as civil proceedings between individuals." Id
179. Knight, [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 37.
180. Id. at 37-43.
181. T. 149/89, Auckland H.C., Oct. 17, 1990 (unpublished judgment) (Robertson J.).
182. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, § 14. Section 14 states: "Everyone
has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and opinions of any kind in any form." Id.
183. Chignell, T. 149/89, at 8.
184. Auckland D.C., Oct. 3, 1990 (unpublished judgment on file with the author).
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case, four young ladies claimed that the defendant sexually abused
them some ten to twelve years earlier. The issue in the preliminary
hearing was whether the long period between the alleged offense
and the complaint was too long to prosecute without constituting
an abuse of process. The district court dismissed each of the
charges against the defendant on the grounds of abuse of process,
despite recent High Court cases siding with complainants where
delays lasted several years.185 In challenging the binding character
of the High Court's judgments, the district court relied in part on
the Preamble of the Bill of Rights Act,186 which affirms and pro-
tects fundamental freedoms in New Zealand, and Section 25(b), 187
which conveys a right to be tried without undue delay. 88 The court
went on to find that the Act "cannot be put to one side as legislat-
ing something again which has always been part of the law. Rather
it seems to me to revive the constitutional notion of ensuring a trial
without delay.' 8 9 Although a decision of the district court has less
influence than decisions of the High Court or the Court of Appeal,
this case, decided in the first weeks after the Bill of Rights came
into force, nonetheless exemplifies the New Zealand judiciary's ea-
gerness to apply and interpret the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
so as to protect the rights and freedoms of New Zealanders.
It would appear that the New Zealand courts have indeed ad-
dressed some of the concerns of the critics of the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act. As stated by New Zealand legal scholars Antony
Shaw and Andrew S. Butler: "In a series of important judgments,
the Court of Appeals has recognized the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act as a significant constitutional document with important
practical implications in a number of diverse areas."19o The judici-
ary has interpreted the Bill of Rights as protecting certain civil
185. Id. at 4-7.
186. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, pmbl. The Preamble states: "An
Act (a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New
Zealand .... " Id.
187. Id. § 25(b). Section 25(b) states: "Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in
relation to the determination of the charge, the following minimum rights: ... (b) The right
to be tried without undue delay .... " Id.
188. Police v. P.C.F., Auckland D.C., Oct. 3, 1990, at 8 (unpublished judgment on file
with the author).
189. Id. at 9-10.
190. Antony Shaw & Andrea S. Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Comes Alive
(1), 1989 N.Z.LJ. 400, 400.
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rights in criminal proceedings;19' protecting freedom of expres-
sion;192 and supporting the argument that the Crown, as a defend-
ant in civil litigation, must be, absent public interest immunity, in
the same legal position as an individual. 93 Thus, as some of the
New Zealand and Canadian legal scholars have predicted, the Bill
of Rights does have some value in protecting fundamental rights
and freedoms, depending upon the willingness of the judiciary to
apply the statute. 194 Based on the New Zealand courts' initial im-
pressions of the Bill of Rights Act, the New Zealand judiciary
clearly will not limit its protection of fundamental rights and free-
doms to only those in existence immediately before the legislation
was enacted, as the Canadian judiciary did with its Bill of Rights
Act.195
Yet, as for Professor Paciocco's argument that the New Zea-
land judiciary "can effect a curial cure for the debilitated Bill,"'196
these remarks must be tempered with the realization that Parlia-
ment can, at any moment, decide to alter or even eliminate this
enactment.197
IV. CONCLUSION
With the adoption of the Bill of Rights Act of 1990, New Zea-
land has taken its first steps away from what Great Britain's Lord
Birkenhead described as an uncontrolled constitution to a con-
trolled constitution. 98 New Zealand is a country where the Gov-
191. See, e.g., R. v. Rangi, [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (Wellington C.A. 1991); R. v. Kirifi,
[19921 2 N.Z.L.R. 8 (Wellington C.A. 1991); Ministry of Transport v. Noort, [1992] 3
N.Z.L.R. 260 (Wellington C.A.); R. v. Crime Appeals, 1991 BUTrERWORTHS CURRENT L
2173 (Wellington C.A.); Police v. P.C.F., Auckland D.C., Oct. 3, 1990 (unpublished judg-
ment on file with the author).
192. R. v. Chignell, T. 149/89, Auckland H.C., Oct. 17, 1990 (unpublished judgment)
(Robertson J.).
193. Knight v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. 30, 37 (Wellington
C.A. 1990). See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME, AUCKLAND DIsTRIcr
LAw SoCIE, THE NEw ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS Acor 1990, 8.11.1 (1990); D.M. Paci-
occo, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 N.Z. RECENT L. REv. 353, 353.
195. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
196. Paciocco, supra note 194, at 353.
197. Ministry of Tr1ansport v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260, 272 (Wellington C.A.).
198. Right Honorable Lord Griffiths, Judicial Independence Abroad-Controlling Brit-
ain's "Uncontrolled" Constitution, JUDGES' J. 29, 38 (1989).
In McCawley v. RX, Lord Birkenhead L.C. said that there is a distinction between
(i) "uncontrolled" constitutions, that is to say, constitutions "the terms of which
may be modified and repealed with no other formality than is necessary in the
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ernment itself has admitted that: (1) the powers of Government are
just too great in a system strictly observing parliamentary
supremacy; (2) the abuse by the executive branch can too easily go
unchecked, except at the ballot box; and (3) New Zealand is one
country that lacks the safeguards for fundamental rights and free-
doms that many other nations enjoy199 and that, consequently, this
move towards the notion that "government ought to be carried on
within a publicly known and enforceable set of constraints" 2o is a
positive one.
Although it is clear that both the Westminster and American
systems of government are founded upon the principles of demo-
cratic law,201 it is no less obvious that a system possessing unre-
strained law-making powers can narrow or eliminate precious
rights and freedoms with little or no opposition.m Living under
even the threat of such potential oppression should be unaccept-
able. Yet, even when the Labour Government itself argued that,
with an entrenched bill of rights, fundamental rights and freedoms
would be protected, the constitutional principle that government is
under the law would be affirmed,2 3 and tyrannical majorities
would be prevented from abusing minorities,204 the Nation as a
whole was not yet ready for such a major change in its system of
government. Thus, the Government enacted the more limited New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act in the hope that it would provide some
of the necessary checks and balances upon the powers of the legis-
lature and administration, as well as perform an educative function
for the citizens of New Zealand. 0 5
case of other legislation," and (ii) "controlled" constitutions, constitutions "which
can only be altered with some special formality, and in some cases by a specially
convened assembly."
Id.
199. PALMER, supra note 132, at 5.
200. Griffiths, supra note 198, at 29. "As the American political scientist Glenn Trader
has said, 'No political idea in the West has greater authority than constitutionalism.' There
has been a remarkably wide and stable consensus that government ought to be carried on
'within a publicly known and enforceable set of constraints."' JIL
201. Id. at 39.
202. PALMER, supra note 132, at 25.
203. Id. at 21.
204. Id. at 23.
205. JusTicE & LAW REFORM COMMrITEE, NEW ZEALAND HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, FINAL REPORT OF T1IE JusTIcE AND LAW REFORM COMMITrEE ON A WHITE PAPER
ON A BILL OF RIG-rs FOR NEW ZEALAND 3 (1988).
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In light of the initial responses to the Bill of Rights Act by.the
New Zealand judiciary, this Act may achieve some of its intended
goals. In the area of criminal procedure, the courts have stated
that the Government cannot take shortcuts by trampling upon the
fundamental rights and freedoms of New Zealanders. This is true
whether it concerns the right to consult and instruct a lawyer with-
out delay, the right of an individual to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty, or the right to be tried without undue delay.206 In
addition, the educative function is fulfilled as people learn of their
rights through public commentary on recent court decisions. In
time, as the public comes to rely on these rights and freedoms and
consider them fundamental, it will be increasingly difficult for the
Government to amend, narrow, or override this enactment.
Still, it must be remembered that, with the governmental ma-
chinery presently in place in New Zealand, Parliament can decide
to alter or eliminate this enactment at any time. Therefore, the
courts must move cautiously in their efforts to protect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms provided in the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act. If the courts are not cautious, the National Govern-
ment may decide to do away with this enactment before the Na-
tion's citizens begin to rely on its protection. On the other hand, if
a prudent approach is taken by the New Zealand courts, eventually
the country will be ready for an entrenched constitutional docu-
ment as proposed by the Bill of Rights White Paper.207
When that day comes, a number of the arguments expressed
during the Parliamentary debates will be again at the forefront of
legal discussion, including the following: (1) which rights are most
important;0 8 (2) whether legislation is necessary for liberty;2 9 (3)
whether social and economic rights should be included in a bill of
206. See supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
208. 509 PARL DEB. (HANSARD) 2801 (statement of Paul East).
They said that the treaty [of Waitangi] was so important that it could not be in-
cluded in ordinary law and, because the new Bill of Rights was ordinary law, not
supreme law, the treaty could not be included in it. However, it has included the
right to life, the right to vote, and the right to liberty in this nicely phrased unen-
forceable Bill-and those are some of the most fundamental rights that New Zea-
landers enjoy.
Id
209. 510 PARL. DEn. (HANSARD) 3452 (statement of Warren Kyd). "It is well known
that liberty lies in the hearts of the people and in the willpower of politicians, not in legisla-
tion." Id.
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rights;210 (4) whether a system observing parliamentary supremacy
has sufficient checks;211 and (5) whether the judiciary is the proper
branch to perform such vital functions. 212 As a result, various ex-
periences shared by the Canadian and United States' judiciaries
should provide valuable lessons for the New Zealand courts.
Although both Canada and the United States have enjoyed
the additional protection against legislative oppression offered by
federalism, there are a number of factors that make their compari-
sons to New Zealand significant, as well as pertinent, to a judiciary
just embarking upon the institution of judicial review. For in-
stance, all three countries were originally under the powers of the
Crown of Great Britain; all three have democratically-elected legis-
latures; all three have had long and emotional debates as to how
far these protection should extend; and all three have included in
their Bill of Rights such concepts as freedom of association, assem-
bly and religion, as well as freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure.
In addition, Canada shares with New Zealand the following:
(1) a common political heritage (a democratically-elected Parlia-
ment in the Westminster tradition); (2) a common legal tradition
(the protection of rights and freedoms by the common law's provi-
sion of remedies); and (3) the fact that both Bills of Rights were
introduced into long-established political systems, promoting fun-
damental shifts of power in government. Thus, it would appear
that the experiences of Canada and, to a lesser degree, the United
States in establishing and interpreting their Bills of Rights are valu-
able comparisons for New Zealand.
210. 502 PARe.. DEB. (HANsAI) 13,040 (statement of the Right Honorable Geoffrey
Palmer).
Such rights would not have been enforceable and it was decided not to include
any of them in the Bill. Bills of Rights are traditionally about putting restraints
on the powers of the State. Hence, they tend to focus on procedural rather than
substantive rights. Social and economic rights are in a different category.
Id
211.. Id at 13,044 (statement of the Honorable W.P. Jeffries). "All sovereign power
resides in the House of Representatives, between elections it is without any other external
constitutional check on the exercise of its sovereign powers." Id
212. Id at 13,046 (statement of the Honorable J.B. Bolger).
Members of the judiciary have tenure for life, or until they are retired at some
venerable age: The Bill transfers the rights to a body that is unrepresentative of
New Zealand-made up of middle-aged to ageing gentlemen who are well paid
and remote, and who of late have increasingly taken to emulating their American
cousins and writing the law.
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If and when New Zealand does adopt an entrenched constitu-
tional document, it will be interesting to see how the New Zealand
courts will deal with some of the more important issues dealt with
by the United States' judiciary. These issues include: (1) whether
possible violations of certain rights should be scrutinized to a
higher degree than others; (2) whether the so-called "preferred po-
sition" argument in the United States would be a possible guide in
light of New Zealand's Parliamentary discussions as to where the
Treaty of Waitangi stands in relation to the Bill of Rights; (3)
whether there is a hierarchy of values in the constitutional docu-
ment; and (4) whether judges should find it natural to use "consti-
tutional adjudication as an instrument of reform" 213 in society.
In addressing the United States' experiences with the "pre-
ferred position" argument, Professors Murphy and Pritchett stated:
In the Carolene Products case of 1938... Stone laid the basis
for a new jurisprudence. He distinguished between economic
rights on the one hand and, on-the other, rights pertaining to
freedom of speech, press, and assembly, to equal protection of
the laws, and those others encompassed in the Bill of Rights.
The last three sets of rights, he thought, were entitled to greater
judicial protection than were economic rights. More particu-
larly, he would later claim, the rights touching on political com-
munication deserved a "preferred position" that would
overcome the usual presumption by judges that a challenged
statute was constitutional.214
Although the "preferred position" was controversial in the
United States, even jurists such as Felix Frankfurter and Benjamin
Cardozo felt that there was a hierarchy of essential rights that
could be enforced against state action. Frankfurter and Cardozo
were opposed to the incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights so as
to apply to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, in Palko v. Connecticut,215 Justice Cardozo "spoke of the
guarantees of the First Amendment as 'the matrix, the indispensa-
ble condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.' ',216
Finally, in examining the constitutional options a judge has to
effect reform in a society, it is imperative to reflect upon the War-
213. Cox, supra note 103, at 182.
214. WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, CouRis, JUDGES AND POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PRocEsS 603-04 (4th ed. 1986).
215. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
216. MURPHY & PRrrcHETr, supra note 214, at 604.
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ren Court era and the Supreme Court's assumption of responsibil-
ity for protecting values and the rights of minorities. As stated by
the eminent Harvard law professor and former United States Solic-
itor General during the Warren Court era, Archibald Cox:
[Wihere the old activist decisions prior to 1937 merely blocked
legislative initiatives in order to maintain the status quo, the de-
cisions of the 1950s and 1960s... were to force major changes in
the established legal and social order. The constitutional protec-
tion for speech and press were vastly expanded. So were proce-
dural safeguards for those accused of crime.. . . The use of
constitutional adjudication as an instrument of reform made
ours a freer, more equal, and more humane society.
217
Yet, in order to maintain legitimacy, a system observing the
institution of judicial review must always recognize the following:
It is important to keep in mind that to accept judicial power as a
legitimate counterweight to popular political sentiment does not
imply that judges are free to ignore the limits on and traditions
of the judicial process. Those traditions impose loose reins
rather than iron fetters, but they do indicate restriction on dis-
cretion. Without a doubt judges sometimes make law and pol-
icy, but they do so in ways different from and more limited than
those of other public officials.2 18
Until the day when New Zealand adopts a constitutionally-en-
trenched bill of rights, the New Zealand courts must decide
whether or not to continue carving out civil liberties from the ex-
isting New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. As this enactment is merely
a statute within a system observing parliamentary supremacy, the
Bill of Rights Act is clearly still on tenuous grounds. Therefore,
should the judiciary choose to continue, they must be careful not to
move too quickly for the public or the legislative branch.219
In conclusion, when examining the opportunities now avail-
able to the New Zealand judiciary by way of the recently-adopted
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, it is worthwhile to consider the
experiences of the Canadian and United States' judiciaries.
Although, unlike their counterparts under the American Constitu-
tion, the New Zealand courts are expressly prohibited from invali-
217. Id at 182-83.
218. 1d at 599-600. See also Cox, supra note 103, at 123.
219. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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dating laws as inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act,220 the Act
does propose a dualism by also specifying that the preferred inter-
pretation of any enactment is one consistent with the Bill of
Rights.221 In addition, the Act expressly specifies the concepts of
judicial review, natural justice, human rights, and fundamental
freedoms222-concepts not expressly included in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Thus, controlling the interpretation of an enactment would
seem to be a logical avenue for the courts.
Although Canada, New Zealand, and the United States all
have shown an interest in protecting individual rights, their meth-
ods of providing protection of these rights differ considerably.
While Canada and the United States enjoy the protection afforded
by added checks and balances based on their federalism precepts,
New Zealand strictly observes Great Britain's Westminster system
of parliamentary supremacy, which does not provide for such pro-
tection. Thus, New Zealand faces a more difficult battle in institut-
ing entrenched individual rights protection.
In order to adopt a constitutionally-entrenched bill of rights,
New Zealand must establish limitations upon the powers of the
legislative branch that are inconsistent with the theory of parlia-
mentary supremacy underlying New Zealand's. Government. In
addition, such limitations could have a major effect upon New Zea-
land's notions of majoritarian democracy and justice, as well as
upon the efficiency of the executive and legislative branches to
make laws in response to the will of their electorate.
Yet, what the Labour Government proposed, first in present-
ing its Bill of Rights White Paper to Parliament and then in enact-
ing this Statute, was what Canada and the United States discovered
in their constitutional developments-that is, that a majority can
be no less tyrannical than an aristocracy in considering the needs of
the minority. Therefore, although on some levels the legislative
and executive branches' efficiency in enacting and administering
laws may suffer as a result of implementing individual rights pro-
220. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, supra note 1, § 4.
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights)-(a) Hold any provision of the
enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or
ineffective; or (b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-by reason
only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.
Id.
221. See id. § 6.
222. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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tection against state action, the countervailing advantage is that all
members in a democratic society such as this will be cared for, re-
gardless of political beliefs or representation in the political
processes.
As the New Zealand judiciary has shown in its brief history
interpreting the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, it is willing to
protect human rights and civil liberties by examining the actions of
public authorities and tribunals in connection with their interpreta-
tions of New Zealand laws. This is very different from what the
Canadian judiciary did when confronted with its 1960 Bill of Rights
Act. Yet, even though it was largely ignored, the Canadian enact-
ment was a stepping-stone for Canada's eventual adoption of their
Constitution Act and Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Therefore,
it would appear that, as suggested in the Final Report of the Justice
and Law Reform Committee on the Bill of Rights White Paper, the
option of eventually adopting an entrenched constitutional docu-
ment is also available to New Zealand should the populace become
sufficiently schooled on the subject and choose to adopt such a
monumental constitutional change. If the initial responses of the
New Zealand judiciary to this enactment are any indication, this
schooling has begun.
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